Séminaire programme ISI (Innovation-Science-Industrie)
Julien Pénin (Université de Strasbourg)
Jeudi 11 mai, 12h-13h30
Salle Manon Cormier
The quality of patent information and the (in)efficiency of the patent system
Many recent studies have emphasized the potential inefficiency of the patent system and advocate either substantial change, or more radically, its abolition. Patents are accused to impede sequential innovation by increasing transaction costs in technology deals, to create anticommons situations (royalty stacking) and to favor hold-up strategies (patent trolls). We show in this paper that all those problems have a common root: the bad quality of patents’ information (which is also linked to the high number of patents in force in the economy). Our objective is hence to understand why patent information is so bad, what are the consequences of this bad information and to propose some changes which could improve the quality of patents information and, in consequence, the economic performance of the patent system.