Coordonnées
GREThA UMR  CNRS 5113
Université Montesquieu  Université de Bordeaux
Avenue Léon Duguit
33608 PESSAC CEDEX
Titre de la thèse
Directeur de thèse
Codirecteur de thèse
Date de début de la thèse
Thèmes de recherche
 Networks Formation
 Game Theory
 Industrial Economics
Enseignement
 2010 2015 : Teaching assistant in Microeconomics Undergraduate 2nd year
 2013 2014 : Teaching assistant in Statistics Undergraduate 1st year
 2014 2015 : Teaching assistant in statistics Undergraduate 3rd year
Présentation/résumé de la thèse
The thesis consists in four essays that deal with bargaining and networks in non cooperative game theory. The First chapter introduce river bargaining games in the context of externalities. The first section entitled The seawall bargaining game deals with a non cooperative approach of an investment game in a context of positive externalities. In the section, we study the set of bilateral bargaining procedures which can be undertaken among geographically related players. The main result shows that the positioning of the agents impacts their incentives to sit at the bargaining table, leading to a chicken game. Results show that an intermediary player should lead the negotiations to improve the societal welfare. The second section deals with the River bargaining problem, that is, more precisely, a non cooperative bargaining on a flowing resource in the presence of negative externalities. The purpose of this study is: (i) to nd the bargaining equilibria given an exogenous bilateral bargaining protocol, and (ii) to study the societal desirability of such equilibria in the presence of heterogeneous players. Results show that depending on the instigator of the bargaining sequences, there are analogies between solutions under the Absolute Territorial Sovereignty and the Unlimited Territorial Integrity principles. The results also show that, depending on the protocol, the impasse point reached in the first negotiation can either strengthen or weaken the relative position of the agents in the forthcoming negotiations. The second chapter deals with the formation of networks of manufacturers and retailers in the presence of negative externalities when players are levelK farsighted. The aim of the chapter are, (i) to characterize the levelK farsighted stable sets as the intensity of competition (the intensity of the externality), so as the cost of linking vary; (ii) to formalize a definition of the social optima and to confront these optima to the stable sets. The results show that, (i) a relatively low level of farsightedness is suffcient to reach the infinite level of farsightedness; (ii) usual definitions of optimality or efficiency find limitations when it comes to be confronted to a setbased definition of stability. (iii) If there is a transitive correspondence between the pairwise farsighted stable set and the level1 farsighted stable set, then this set is likely to be strongly efficient. The last chapter is entitled Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation. This theoretic chapter proposes the concept of a von NeumannMorgenstern farsighted stable set with bargaining. Under this solution concept, the stable networks so as the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule emerge endogenously. This chapter provides necessary conditions under which a von NeumannMorgenstern farsighted stable set with bargaining sustains the strongly efficient networks.
Communication
 7th UECE Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications, ISEG, Lisbon, November 57th, 2015
 6th UECE Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications, ISEG, Lisbon, November 57th, 2014
 1st FAERE conference on Environmental Economics, LAMETA, Montpellier, September, 1112th, 2014
 5th UECE Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications, ISEG, Lisbon, November 79th 2013
 13th SAET Conference on Current Trends in Economics, MINES ParisTech, Paris, July 2227th, 2013
 14th Public Economic Theory (PET13), Catolica, Lisbon, July 57th 2013
 1st Bordeaux Economic Theory Workshop on "Interactions, Institutions and Design", GREThA, Bordeaux, May 28th 2013
Publication
 The Seawall bargaining Game, Games 2014, 5(2), 127139 With JC Pereau :
 Abstract: Agents located from downstream to upstream along an estuary and exposed to a flooding risk have to invest in facilities like a seawall (or dike). As the benefits of that local public good increase along the estuary, upstream agents have to bargain for monetary compensation with the most downstream agent in exchange for more protection effort. The paper analyses different bargaining protocols and determines the conditions under which agents are better off. The results show that upstream agents are involved in a chicken game when they have to bargain with the most downstream agent.
 Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation, Economics Letters 2015, 137, 5053 With N. Carayol and V. Vannetelbosch :
 Abstract: We study the stability of networks when players are farsighted and allocations are determined endogenously. The set of strongly efficient networks is the unique von Neumann–Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if the value function is anonymous, component additive and top convex and the allocation rule is anonymous and component efficient. Moreover, the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule emerges endogenously.
 (Previous version here.)
Working Papers:


The River Bargaining Problem with JeanChristophe Pereau:
Abstract: This article analyses the outcomes of different negotiation procedures between three agents located along a river in a Rubinstein alternating offers model where agents bargain over transfers and water consumption levels. Unlike for simultaneous bargaining, agreements in sequential bargaining are not efficient for society, even if the period between stages becomes infinitely small. This ineffciency results from the player's inside options, which are given by their temporary disagreement payoffs. Results also show that depending on the sequence of moves, inside options and impasse points can strengthen or weaken the relative position of the players involved in the negotiation process
 LevelK Farsightedness in a Vertically related Economy.

Abstract: The second chapter deals with the formation of networks of manufacturers and retailers in the presence of negative externalities when players are levelK farsighted. The aim of the chapter are, (i) to characterize the levelK farsighted stable sets as the intensity of competition (the intensity of the externality), so as the cost of linking vary; (ii) to formalize a definition of the social optima and to confront these optima to the stable sets. The results show that, (i) a relatively low level of farsightedness is suffcient to reach the infinite level of farsightedness; (ii) usual definitions of optimality or efficiency find limitations when it comes to be confronted to a setbased definition of stability. (iii) If there is a transitive correspondence between the pairwise farsighted stable set and the level1 farsighted stable set, then this set is likely to be strongly efficient.